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SHOULD ATTORNEYS HAVE A DUTY TO REPORT 
FINANCIAL ABUSE OF THE ELDERLY? 
Carolyn L. Dessin∗ 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Exploitation of older persons is a growing problem in America.1  
As a result, our legal and social systems are struggling to develop 
structures that will prevent, remedy and punish instances of abuse.  From 
all indications, financial abuse is becoming increasingly common, and 
can be devastating to its victim.2 
States have enacted a wide variety of statutes aimed at alleviating 
financial abuse.3  There are two relevant bodies of law: a state’s 
protective services law and the state’s criminal law.  Although one may 
normally think of the purpose of the criminal law as deterring and 
punishing crimes, and the protective services law as protecting a state’s 
vulnerable citizens, the two bodies of law are frequently closely 
intertwined in this area.  Thus, a law enforcement officer may have a 
duty to notify the appropriate protective services personnel of suspected 
abuse and the protective services worker may have a duty to report 
suspected abuse to law enforcement. 
 
∗Associate Professor of Law, The University of Akron School of Law.  J.D., Villanova University 
School of Law; M.M., Westminster Choir College; B.M. Ed., Temple University.  The author would 
like to thank the University of Akron School of Law for its support of the research for this article.  
She also thanks Christopher Stewart for his research assistance. 
 1. See generally Elder Abuse: A Decade of Shame and Inaction: Hearing Before the 
Subcomm. on Health and Long Term Care of the House Select Comm. on Aging, 101st Cong. 1 
(1990) (discussing prevalence of abuse) [hereinafter 1990 House Report].  The 1990 House Report 
was the follow-up to a 1981 report: STAFF OF HOUSE SELECT COMM. ON AGING, 97TH CONG., 
ELDER ABUSE: AN EXAMINATION OF A HIDDEN PROBLEM (Comm. Print 1981) [hereinafter 1981 
House Report]. 
 2. See 1981 House Report, supra note 1, at XV.  Cf. National Survey of Abuse of the Elderly 
in Canada, 4 J. ELDER ABUSE & NEGLECT (1/2), 5 (1992) (finding that financial abuse is the most 
common type of elder abuse in Canada). 
 3. See generally Carolyn L. Dessin, Financial Abuse of the Elderly: Is the Solution a 
Problem?, 34 MCGEORGE L. REV. 267 (2003) (describing various approaches). 
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Each state has a mechanism for protecting vulnerable citizens.  
Thus, a state will have some agency charged with protecting the interests 
of those who need protection.  Additionally, each state has a mechanism 
to allow a court of proper jurisdiction to appoint a guardian for the estate 
of a person who is adjudged incompetent.  These protective 
arrangements intervene when a person is likely to be taken advantage of 
by others, but only after the protective services personnel learn of a 
potential problem. 
With respect to criminalizing exploitation, states have taken a 
variety of approaches.  Some states specifically criminalize financial 
abuse of the elderly.4  Others rely on criminal statutes of general 
application to proscribe exploitation.5  Still others use the age or 
vulnerability of the victim as a sentencing enhancement.6 
In addition to the statutes proscribing exploitation, many states have 
chosen to impose a duty to report suspected abuse.7  This is an attractive 
addition to the arsenal of weapons to combat exploitation.  The rationale 
underlying these reporting statutes is simple: many more cases of abuse 
are likely to receive the attention they require from law enforcement and 
protective services agencies if we impose a duty to report suspected 
abuse to one or both of those agencies. 
There has been some discussion about the effectiveness of 
mandatory reporting statutes.  Some see them as an important tool in 
remedying elder abuse while others see them as relatively unimportant 
because failure to report is seldom prosecuted.8  Regardless of the actual 
 
 4. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 368 (2005); COL. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-6.5-103(5) (2004). 
 5. See, e.g., D.C. CODE ANN. § 22-3211 (2004) (setting forth offense of theft); see IOWA 
CODE ANN. § 726.8 (2003) (criminalizing “wanton neglect or nonsupport of a dependent adult”). 
 6. See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.174a (2004). 
 7. See infra notes 4-6, 10-14 and accompanying text. 
 8. See, e.g., Nina A. Kohn, Second Childhood: What Child Protection Systems Can Teach 
Elder Protection Systems, 14 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 175, 188 (2003); Seymour Moskowitz, 
Golden Age in the Golden State: Contemporary Legal Developments in Elder Abuse and Neglect, 
36 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 589, 611 (2003); Victoria Vron, Note, Using RICO to Fight Understaffing in 
Nursing Homes: How Federal Prosecution Using RICO can Reduce Abuse and Neglect of the 
Elderly, 71 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1025, 1031 (2003).  See also B.E. Blakely et al., Improving the 
Responses of Physicians to Elder Abuse and Neglect: Contributions of a Model Program, 19 J. 
GERONTOLOGICAL SOC. WORK 35, 37 (1993) (discussing a model program for improving elder 
abuse reporting by physicians); Carolyn Lea Clark-Daniels et al., Abuse and Neglect of the Elderly: 
Are Emergency Department Personnel Aware of Mandatory Reporting Laws?, 19 ANNALS OF 
EMERGENCY MED. 970, 970 (1990) (stating that “[m]any medical professionals are either unaware 
of state mandatory reporting laws or choose to disregard them”); Charles Pratt, Comment: Banks’ 
Effectiveness at Reporting Financial Abuse of Elders: An Assessment and Recommendations for 
Improvements in California, 40 CAL. W. L. REV. 195, 202 (2003). 
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efficacy of such statutes, they exist in many jurisdictions.9  This Article 
will therefore put the efficacy issue aside and focus on whether an 
attorney can and should report suspected abuse under a mandatory 
reporting statute. 
Part Two of this article will examine the various states’ approaches 
to mandatory reporting of abuse.  Part Three will explore the various 
states’ rules governing attorney conduct.  Part Four will analyze the 
interaction of the mandatory reporting provisions with the rules 
governing attorney conduct.  Finally, Part Five will discuss whether 
requiring attorneys to report suspected elder abuse is desirable. 
II.  THE VARIOUS STATES’ APPROACHES TO MANDATORY REPORTING 
States have enacted a variety of statutes mandating reporting of 
suspected financial abuse of the elderly.  These approaches will be 
discussed seriatim. 
First, some states mandate that anyone having a reasonable 
suspicion that an older person is being abused has a duty to report it.10  
This sweeping approach would include attorneys as mandatory reporters. 
Second, some states require that only those members of certain 
listed professions have a duty to report elder abuse.  In some states, that 
list includes attorneys,11 while in other states it does not.12 
Third, some states do not impose any mandatory duty to report 
 
 9. See infra notes 10-14 and accompanying text. 
 10. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 31, § 3910 (2005); IND. CODE ANN. § 12-10-3-9 (2004); KY. REV. 
STAT. ANN. § 209.030(2) (2004); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:403.2(C) (2004); MISS. CODE ANN. § 
43-47-7 (2004); MO. ANN. STAT. § 660.255(1) (2004); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 108A-102(a) (2004); 
N.M. STAT. ANN. §  27-7-30 (2005); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43A, § 10-104 (2004); R.I. GEN. LAWS 
§ 42-66-8 (2004); S.C. CODE ANN. § 43-35-25 (2004); TENN. CODE ANN. § 71-6-103(b) (2004); 
TEX. HUM. RES. CODE ANN. § 48.051 (2004); UTAH CODE ANN. § 62A-3-305 (2004); WYO. STAT. 
ANN. § 35-20-103(a) (2004). 
 11. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 46-454(B) (2004); MONT. CODE ANN. § 52-3-811(3)(f) (2004); 
NEV. REV. STAT. § 200.5093 (2004); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5101.61A (2005). 
 12. ALA. CODE § 38-9-8 (2004); ALASKA STAT. § 47.24.010 (2004) ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-28-
203 (2004); CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 15630 (2005); COL. REV. STAT. § 26-3.1-102 (2004); 2005 
Bill Text CO S.B. 98 (pending legislation to make reporting mandatory in Colorado); CONN. GEN. 
STAT. ANN. § 17b-451 (2004); D.C. CODE ANN. § 7-1903 (2005); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 415.1034(1) 
(2004); GA. CODE ANN. § 30-5-4 (2004); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 346-224 (2004); IDAHO CODE § 
39-5303 (2004); ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. ch. 320, § 20/2(f-5) (2004); IOWA CODE ANN. § 235B.3 
(2003); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 39-1431 (2003); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 3477 (2004); MD. 
CODE ANN. FAM. LAW § 14-302 (2003); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 19A, § 15 (2005); MICH. 
COMP. LAWS ANN. § 400.11a (2004); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 626.5572(16) (2004); MO. ANN. STAT. § 
565.188 (2004); NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-372 (2004); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 161-F:46 (2004); VT. 
STAT. ANN. tit. 33, § 6903 (2004); VA. CODE ANN. §  63.2-1606 (2004); WASH. REV. CODE §  
74.34.035 (2004); WASH. REV. CODE. § 74.34.020 (2004); W. VA. CODE §  9-6-9 (2004). 
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suspected abuse.13  Some of these states establish a procedure by which 
one wishing to report abuse may report it.14 
III.  RULES GOVERNING ATTORNEY CONDUCT 
A.  The Model Rules of Professional Conduct 
Any mandatory reporting statute immediately implicates the 
attorney’s duty to maintain client confidences.  Thus, consideration of 
the issue must begin with an examination of the contours of that duty. 
The provisions of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct govern 
attorney behavior in most states, although some states have made 
significant alterations to those rules.15  As a result of “Ethics 2000,” the 
American Bar Association approved changes to the Model Rules of 
Professional Conduct.16  Most states that have adopted some version of 
the Model Rules of Professional Conduct have not yet changed their 
professional conduct rules in accordance with the Ethics 2000 
revisions.17  Of the states that have not adopted the Ethics 2000 
revisions, all states except Georgia have either a state bar committee 
conducting a review of the revisions or have a state bar report issued 
pending further action on adopting the revisions.18  Accordingly, this 
article will examine both the old and new rules as they relate to 
mandatory reporting.19 
Although there are clear rules regarding the attorney’s duty to 
maintain client confidences, the Model Rules of Professional Conduct do 
not directly address the issue of mandatory reporting. Thus, the attorney 
should keep in mind the admonition in the Scope of the Rules: “The 
 
 13. New York and South Dakota are such states, as are North Dakota, New Jersey, 
Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin.  N.D. CENT. CODE §  50-25.2-03 (2003); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:27d-
409 (2000); PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 10225.302 (2000); WIS STAT. ANN. § 46.90 (2004). 
 14. See, e.g., N.D. CENT. CODE §  50-25.2-03 (2003). 
 15. An overwhelming majority of states have adopted some version of the Model Rules of 
Professional Conduct.  Hence, the discussion in this article will focus on the Model Rules rather 
than the older Model Code of Professional Responsibility, including the Ethical Considerations and 
Disciplinary Rules.  For comparison, this article will briefly discuss the rules of the state of Ohio, a 
Code state.  See infra notes 24-31 and accompanying text. 
 16. A chart showing the state-by-state status of the Ethics 2000 changes appears at 
http://www.abanet.org/cpr/jclr/ethics_2000_status_chart.pdf. 
 17. Id. 
 18. Id. 
 19. See id.  For a comprehensive state-by-state examination of the Model Rules, see 
GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR. & W. WILLIAM HODES, THE LAW OF LAWYERING, A HANDBOOK ON 
THE MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT, App. 4 (2d Ed. 2001).  See also Dan W. Holbrook, 
Where There’s a Will: How the New Ethics Rules Affect Estate Planners, 39 TENN. B.J. 31 (2003). 
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Rules of Professional Conduct are rules of reason. They should be 
interpreted with reference to the purposes of legal representation and of 
the law itself.”20  Further, the drafters of the Rules did not intend the 
Rules to completely define the parameters of a lawyer’s duties.21  Rather, 
the drafters intended the rules to operate in a larger social and ethical 
context.  Thus, an attorney must frequently look beyond the Rules in 
resolving difficult ethical dilemmas. 
1.  Pre-Ethics 2000 Rules 
Under the pre-Ethics 2000 version of the Model Rules of 
Professional Conduct, it would be difficult to argue that an attorney 
could reveal confidential information concerning potential financial 
abuse.  Rule 1.6 of the pre-Ethics 2000 Model Rules of Professional 
Conduct provides: 
RULE 1.6: CONFIDENTIALITY OF INFORMATION 
(a)  A lawyer shall not reveal information relating to the representation 
of a client unless the client consents after consultation, except for 
disclosures that are impliedly authorized in order to carry out the 
representation, and except as stated in  paragraph (b). 
(b)  A lawyer may reveal such information the extent the lawyer 
reasonably believes necessary: 
(1)   to prevent the client from committing a criminal act that the 
lawyer believes is likely to result in imminent death or substantial 
bodily harm; or 
(2)   to establish a claim or defense on behalf of the lawyer in a 
controversy between the lawyer and the client, to establish a defense to 
a criminal charge or civil claim against the lawyer based upon conduct 
in which the client was involved, or to respond to allegations in any 
proceeding concerning the lawyer’s representation of the client.22 
It would be extremely difficult for an attorney to argue that he 
could reveal confidential information pertaining to potential financial 
 
 20. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Scope ¶ 14 (2004). 
 21. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Scope ¶ 16 (2004) (providing: “The Rules do 
not, however, exhaust the moral and ethical considerations that should inform a lawyer, for no 
worthwhile human activity can be completely defined by legal rules. The Rules simply provide a 
framework for the ethical practice of law.”). 
 22. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6 (2002). 
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abuse under this formulation of Rule 1.6.  Under subsection (b)(1), only 
abuse bad enough to result in serious imminent physical harm could be 
revealed, and most financial abuse does not rise to that level. 
2.  Ethics 2000 Revisions to the Rules 
The Ethics 2000 revisions to the Model Rules for Professional 
Responsibility made several changes to the rule governing 
confidentiality of information.  Rule 1.6 of the revised Model Rules for 
Professional Conduct provides: 
RULE 1.6: CONFIDENTIALITY OF INFORMATION 
(a)  A lawyer shall not reveal information relating to the representation 
of a client unless the client gives informed consent, the disclosure is 
impliedly authorized in order to carry out the representation or the 
disclosure is permitted by paragraph (b). 
(b)  A lawyer may reveal information relating to the representation of a 
client to the extent the lawyer reasonably believes necessary: 
(1)  to prevent reasonably certain death or substantial bodily harm; 
(2)  to secure legal advice about the lawyer’s compliance with these 
Rules; to establish a claim or defense on behalf of the lawyer in a 
controversy between the lawyer and the client, to establish a defense to 
a criminal charge or civil claim against the lawyer based upon conduct 
in which the client was involved, or to respond to allegations in any 
proceeding concerning the lawyer’s representation of the client; or to 
comply with other law or a court order.23 
Under this revised version of Rule 1.6, it seems clear that an 
attorney could reveal confidential information to comply with a 
mandatory reporting statute under subsection (b)(4).  Subsection (b)(1) 
might also be implicated if the financial abuse or potential thereof is 
severe enough that it is likely to result in serious physical harm, which 
seems less likely. 
What also seems clear, however, is that revised Rule 1.6 would not 
allow a lawyer to report potential financial abuse unless his state 
requires reporting.  Thus, in a state that allows reporting but does not 
require it, the attorney could not argue that disclosure of confidential 
information relating to the abuse was “to comply with” state law. 
 
 23. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6 (2004). 
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B.  The Code of Professional Responsibility 
Because a handful of states have attorney discipline rules based on 
the older Model Code of Professional Responsibility, including the 
Ethical Considerations and Disciplinary Rules, a brief comparison of 
those rules is warranted.  These states’ rules vary fairly significantly, and 
the Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility will be used as an 
example. 
The Code of Professional Responsibility Model consisted of three 
parts: the Canons, the Ethical Considerations and the Disciplinary Rules.  
In the words of the preface to the Ohio Code of Professional 
Responsibility: 
The Canons of this Code are statements of axiomatic norms, 
expressing in general terms the standards of professional conduct 
expected of lawyers in their relationships with the public, with the 
legal system, and with the legal profession. They embody the general 
concepts from which the Ethical Considerations and the Disciplinary 
Rules are derived. 
The Ethical Considerations are aspirational in character and represent 
the objectives toward which every member of the profession should 
strive. They constitute a body of principles upon which the lawyer can 
rely for guidance in many specific situations. 
The Disciplinary Rules, unlike the Ethical Considerations, are 
mandatory in character. The Disciplinary Rules state the minimum 
level of conduct below which no lawyer can fall without being subject 
to disciplinary action.24 
Each of the relevant Canons, Ethical Considerations and 
Disciplinary Rules relating to maintaining client confidences must be 
considered in determining whether an attorney can report suspected 
exploitation.  Canon 4 states that “a lawyer should preserve the 
confidences and secrets of a client.”25  Additionally, the following 
Ethical Considerations are relevant: 
EC 4-1 Both the fiduciary relationship existing between lawyer and 
client and the proper functioning of the legal system require the 
preservation by the lawyer of confidences and secrets of one who has 
employed or sought to employ him. A client must feel free to discuss 
whatever he wishes with his lawyer and a lawyer must be equally free 
 
 24. OHIO CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Preface (2002). 
 25. Id. at Canon 4. 
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to obtain information beyond that volunteered by his client. A lawyer 
should be fully informed of all the facts of the matter he is handling in 
order for his client to obtain the full advantage of our legal system. It is 
for the lawyer in the exercise of his independent professional judgment 
to separate the relevant and important from the irrelevant and 
unimportant. The observance of the ethical obligation of a lawyer to 
hold inviolate the confidences and secrets of his client not only 
facilitates the full development of facts essential to proper 
representation of the client but also encourages laymen to seek early 
legal assistance. 
EC 4-2 The obligation to protect confidences and secrets obviously 
does not preclude a lawyer from revealing information when his client 
consents after full disclosure, when necessary to perform his 
professional employment, when permitted by a Disciplinary Rule, or 
when required by law. Unless the client otherwise directs, a lawyer 
may disclose the affairs of his client to partners or associates of his 
firm. It is a matter of common knowledge that the normal operation of 
a law office exposes confidential professional information to 
nonlawyer employees of the office, particularly secretaries and those 
having access to the files; and this obligates a lawyer to exercise care 
in selecting and training his employees so that the sanctity of all 
confidences and secrets of his clients may be presented. If the 
obligation extends to two or more clients as to the same information, a 
lawyer should obtain the permission of all before revealing the 
information. A lawyer must always be sensitive to the rights and 
wishes of his client and act scrupulously in the making of decisions 
which may involve the disclosure of information obtained in his 
professional relationship. Thus, in the absence of consent of his client 
after full disclosure, a lawyer should not associate another lawyer in 
the handling of a matter; nor should he, in the absence of consent, seek 
counsel from another lawyer if there is a reasonable possibility that the 
identity of the client or his confidences or secrets would be revealed to 
such lawyer. Both social amenities and professional duty should cause 
a lawyer to shun indiscreet conversations concerning his clients. 
EC 4-3 Unless the client otherwise directs, it is not improper for a 
lawyer to give limited information from his files to an outside agency 
necessary for statistical, bookkeeping, accounting, data processing, 
banking, printing, or other legitimate purposes, provided he exercises 
due care in the selection of the agency and warns the agency that the 
information must be kept confidential. 
EC 4-4 The attorney-client privilege is more limited than the ethical 
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obligation of a lawyer to guard the confidences and secrets of his 
client. This ethical precept, unlike the evidentiary privilege, exists 
without regard to the nature or source of information or the fact that 
others share the knowledge. A lawyer should endeavor to act in a 
manner which preserves the evidentiary privilege; for example, he 
should avoid professional discussions in the presence of persons to 
whom the privilege does not extend. A lawyer owes an obligation to 
advise the client of the attorney-client privilege and timely to assert the 
privilege unless it is waived by the client. 
EC 4-5 A lawyer should not use information acquired in the course of 
the representation of a client to the disadvantage of the client and a 
lawyer should not use, except with the consent of his client after full 
disclosure, such information for his own purposes. Likewise, a lawyer 
should be diligent in his efforts to prevent the misuse of such 
information by his employees and associates. Care should be exercised 
by a lawyer to prevent the disclosure of the confidences and secrets of 
one client to another, and no employment should be accepted that 
might require such disclosure. 
EC 4-6 The obligation of a lawyer to preserve the confidences and 
secrets of clients continues after the termination of employment. A 
lawyer should also provide for the protection of the confidences and 
secrets of clients following the termination of the practice of the 
lawyer, whether termination is due to death, disability, or retirement. 
For example, a lawyer might provide for the personal papers of the 
client to be returned to the client and for the papers of the lawyer to be 
delivered to another lawyer or to be destroyed. In determining the 
method of disposition, the instructions and wishes of the client should 
be a dominant consideration.26 
The Disciplinary Rules place limits on an attorney’s ability to 
reveal confidential information.  Disciplinary Rule 4-101 states: 
DR 4-101. PRESERVATION OF CONFIDENCES AND SECRETS 
OF A CLIENT. 
(A) “Confidence” refers to information protected by the attorney-client 
privilege under applicable law, and “secret” refers to other information 
gained in the professional relationship that the client has requested be 
held inviolate or the disclosure of which would be embarrassing or 
would be likely to be detrimental to the client. 
 
 26. Id. at EC 4-1 - 4-6. 
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(B) Except when permitted under DR 4-101(C), a lawyer shall not 
knowingly: 
(1) Reveal a confidence or secret of his client. 
(2) Use a confidence or secret of his client to the disadvantage of the 
client. 
(3) Use a confidence or secret of his client for the advantage of himself 
or of a third person, unless the client consents after full disclosure. 
(C) A lawyer may reveal: 
(1) Confidences or secrets with the consent of the client or clients 
affected, but only after a full disclosure to them. 
(2) Confidences or secrets when permitted under Disciplinary Rules or 
required by law or court order. 
(3) The intention of his client to commit a crime and the information 
necessary to prevent the crime. 
(4) Confidences or secrets necessary to establish or collect his fee or to 
defend himself or his employees or associates against an accusation of 
wrongful conduct. 
(D) A lawyer shall exercise reasonable care to prevent his employees, 
associates, and others whose services are utilized by him from 
disclosing or using confidences or secrets of a client, except that a 
lawyer may reveal the information allowed by DR 4-101(C) through 
an employee.27 
Thus, with respect to mandatory reporting of suspected 
exploitation, Ethical Consideration 4-2 allows the disclosure of 
confidential information when required by law.28  Further, Disciplinary 
Rule 4-101(C)(2) allows disclosure of confidential information when 
required by law.29  Additionally, if the abuser is the attorney’s client, 
Disciplinary Rule 4-101(C)(3) allows the lawyer to reveal confidential 
information relating to his client’s intended criminal activity.30  
 
 27. Id. at DR 4-101. 
 28. Id. at EC 4-2. 
 29. Id. at DR 4-101(C)(2). 
 30. Id. at DR 4-101(C)(3). 
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Accordingly, an attorney could report suspected abuse under a 
mandatory reporting statute, which Ohio has enacted.31 
IV.  THE INTERACTION OF MANDATORY REPORTING AND RULES 
GOVERNING CLIENT CONFIDENCES 
When a state requires an attorney to report suspected abuse of an 
older or vulnerable person, it immediately creates the possibility that an 
attorney will be required to reveal confidential information learned in the 
course of the attorney-client relationship.  Despite this inevitable 
interaction of a mandatory reporting duty and the attorney’s professional 
duty to keep a client’s confidences, few states have spoken definitively 
on the issue.32  Thus, an attorney is often left to determine whether he 
can and should report abuse. 
Three basic approaches to the interaction are possible.  First, a state 
may impose a mandatory reporting duty on attorneys without speaking 
on the issue of the attorney’s duty to maintain client confidences.  This is 
the approach in Arizona,33 Delaware,34 Indiana,35 Louisiana,36 
Mississippi,37 New Mexico,38 North Carolina,39 Ohio,40 Oklahoma,41 
Rhode Island,42 Tennessee,43 Utah44 and Wyoming.45 
Second, a state may impose a reporting duty on attorneys and 
provide that an attorney may raise the attorney client privilege as a 
defense for failing to report.  This is the approach taken by Florida,46 
Kentucky,47 Montana,48 Nevada,49 New Hampshire50 and South 
 
 31. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5101.61(A)(6)(g)(ii) (2005). 
 32. See e.g., infra notes 33-52. 
 33. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 46-454(B) (2004). 
 34. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 31, § 3910 (2005). 
 35. IND. CODE ANN. § 12-10-3-9 (2004). 
 36. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:403.2(C) (2004). 
 37. MISS. CODE ANN. § 43-47-7 (2004). 
 38. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 27-7-30 (2005). 
 39. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 108A-102(a) (2004). 
 40. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5101.61A (2005). 
 41. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43A, § 10-104 (2004). 
 42. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 42-66-8 (2004). 
 43. TENN. CODE ANN. § 71-6-103(b) (2004). 
 44. UTAH CODE ANN. § 62A-3-305 (2004). 
 45. WYO. STAT. ANN. § 35-20-103(a) (2004). 
 46. FLA. STAT. §§  415.1034, 415.1045 (2004). 
 47. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 209.030 (2004).  In Kentucky, an Attorney General’s Opinion 
provides that an attorney need not, in fact cannot, report domestic abuse if a client directs otherwise.  
Ky. Op. Att’y. Gen. 83-367 (1983).  Presumably this same reasoning would apply to elder abuse, 
although an argument for a different approach could be made.  For a discussion of personal 
autonomy concerns involving elder abuse reporting, see infra notes 58-59 and accompanying text. 
DESSIN1.DOC 5/2/2005  8:57:53 AM 
718 AKRON LAW REVIEW [38:707 
Carolina.51 
Third, a state may impose a reporting duty on attorneys and 
specifically abrogate the attorney-client privilege when the attorney 
suspects that abuse is occurring.  Only Texas takes this approach to the 
interaction of mandatory reporting and the attorney’s duty to protect 
client confidences.52 
In the remaining states, an attorney is not under an obligation to 
report suspected abuse of an older or vulnerable person.  Frequently, 
however, there is a mechanism in place should the attorney choose to 
report such abuse.53  The attorney in these states is faced with a difficult 
question: can he report potential abuse?  In light of the language of 
Model Rule of Professional Conduct 1.6 in both the pre- and post-Ethics 
2000 versions, it is unlikely that an attorney could argue that he was 
reporting to avoid serious physical harm or comply with law.54  Thus, it 
seems unlikely that an attorney could argue that he was allowed to report 
if the report required the disclosure of otherwise confidential 
information.  Under a Model Code formulation, the attorney might be 
able to reveal confidential information regarding commission of a crime, 
but only if his client is the abuser rather than the victim and only if the 
crime has not yet been committed.55 
V.  THE DESIRABILITY OF REQUIRING ATTORNEYS TO REPORT 
SUSPECTED ELDER ABUSE 
Although empirical study of the issue is difficult if not impossible, 
there have been reliable estimates that elder abuse is widely 
underreported.  One study suggested that only one in eight cases gets 
reported.56  It seems clear that society has an important interest in 
attempting to prevent and remedy abuse.57  In light of what appears to be 
 
 48. MONT. CODE ANN. § 52-3-811(3)(f) (2004) (providing an attorney has an obligation to 
report suspected exploitation unless the attorney acquired the facts causing the suspicion from a 
client and the information is protected by the attorney-client privilege). 
 49. NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 200.5093 (2004) (providing an attorney has an obligation to 
report suspected exploitation unless the attorney acquired the information underlying the suspicion 
from a client who has been or may be accused of the exploitation). 
 50. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 161-F:48 (2004). 
 51. S.C. CODE ANN. § 43-35-50 (2004). 
 52. TEX. HUM. RES. CODE § 48.051 (2004). 
 53. See, e.g., N.D. CENT. CODE § 50-25.2-03 (1999). 
 54. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6 (2004). 
 55. OHIO CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 4-101 (2002). 
 56. See 1990 House Report, supra note 1. 
 57. See generally 1990 House Report, supra note 1. 
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significant underreporting of incidences of abuse, mandating reporting 
of suspected abuse is a rational attempt to accomplish increased 
reporting. 
Any discussion of the desirability of requiring attorneys to report 
suspected elder abuse must begin with an attempt to define of such 
abuse.  When defining financial abuse, states generally rely on concepts 
like the “misuse” of another’s assets without “consent.”  The difficulty 
in precisely defining exploitation comes in the attempt to give meaning 
to the fairly vague term “misuse.”58 
Most alleged incidents of exploitation involve the transfer of assets 
from one person to another.  In order for a transfer to be a “misuse,” it 
would probably have to be made involuntarily or without consent.  This 
presents the attorney with a difficult situation.  How can an attorney look 
inside the client’s mind to determine whether a transfer is being made 
with consent?  Of course, it is impossible to “know” the subjective intent 
of another.  The attorney will have to rely on the client’s statements and 
surrounding actions and on the attorney’s impressions of the propriety of 
the situation as a whole. 
A further difficulty for the attorney arises from the very nature of 
intra-family transfers.  Consider a mother who comes to the attorney and 
declares that she wants to transfer a major portion of her assets to her 
son immediately and as an outright gift.  It is impossible to state that 
such a transaction is per se abusive or per se not abusive.  If the client is 
competent and is making the transfer voluntarily and knowingly, the 
transfer is probably not a product of exploitation.  People transfer assets 
for any number of reasons - pure donative intent, estate planning, 
entitlement planning, or persuasion by the donee to name but the few 
most common motivations. 
Thus, even when a client declares an intent to transfer the bulk of 
her assets, the attorney should not simply conclude that the transfer is 
abusive.  Such a conclusion would be a serious intrusion on the personal 
autonomy of the donor.  As long as the attorney thinks that the client is 
capable of making an informed decision, the attorney should not equate 
what the attorney views as an unwise choice with exploitation. 
Nevertheless, it is important that attorneys consider the potential for 
abuse in property transfers.  In addition to an attorney’s duty to maintain 
client confidences, an attorney also has a duty to provide competent 
 
 58. Sometimes, the statutory proscription is so vague that it fails to pass constitutional muster.  
See James Cuda v. State of Fla., 639 So. 2d 22, 23 (Fla. 1994) (holding that FLA. STAT. ch. 415.11 
(1991) is unconstitutionally vague). 
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representation.59  It would be difficult to argue that an attorney that 
allows a known abusive transfer of assets to proceed is providing that 
representation. 
Thus, despite the difficulty of the task, the frequent role of the 
attorney as a client’s most trusted and knowledgeable advisor suggests 
that attorneys cannot be relieved of a duty to consider whether proposed 
transactions are abusive.  Other than the transferor and transferee, the 
attorney may be the only person to know that a transfer is being made.  
Although legislative histories are silent on the topic, this is most likely 
the rationale that has led some states to make attorneys mandated 
reporters.  Similarly, some states have chosen to make other trusted 
financial advisors mandatory reporters, probably for the same reason.60 
The attorney, then, is faced with the difficult task of deciding 
whether a particular transfer requested by a client is potential abuse.  In 
this regard, an attorney will need to use his or her best judgment in light 
of the circumstances surrounding the transaction.  There is no easy 
formula for deciding when a transaction is abusive.  The transferor’s 
clear sense of the purpose for the transaction is important, but the 
attorney must be careful not to impose his or her feelings about the 
worth of that purpose on an otherwise competent client. 
There are, of course, two added complications that must be 
considered.  First, it is not unusual for an older client to be brought to the 
lawyer’s office by another person.  Frequently, that person remains in 
the office with the older client during consultation with the lawyer.  This 
sometimes raises an issue concerning who the client is. 
Consider a situation in which an adult child brings her father to the 
attorney’s office and sits with him during the lawyer’s consultation.  The 
daughter tells the lawyer, “Dad wants to re-title the house in my name.”  
Presumably the lawyer would not take such a step without being certain 
that that is what the father, the asset’s owner, really wants.  But who is 
the client in that circumstance?  The daughter?  She is the one who 
directed the lawyer’s work.  The father?  He is the one for whom the 
work is really being done.  Both the daughter and the father?  Their 
presence together in the lawyer’s office could suggest that they view this 
as a joint representation. 
There is some literature about the ethical considerations of 
 
 59. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.1 (2004) (providing: “A lawyer shall 
provide competent representation to a client.  Competent representation requires the legal 
knowledge, skill, thoroughness and preparation reasonably necessary for the representation.”). 
 60. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 46-454(B) (2004) (applying to accountants); ARK. CODE 
ANN. § 5-28-203 (2004) (covering bankers). 
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representing multiple members of the same family who belong to 
different generations.61  Sadly, that literature suggests that there are no 
easy answers for the attorney involved with members of multiple 
generations of the same family.  That attorney may frequently find 
himself in situations in which he is unsure of who the real client is and 
whether he has is representing clients with conflicting interests.  In most 
cases, the Model Rules provide no clear answer. 
Second, an attorney may be asked to accomplish a transfer of assets 
from an older person to a younger person, by the younger person.  This 
raises several ethical questions.  Again, there is the issue of determining 
who is the client.  Many attorneys take the position that the unseen asset 
owner is the client, despite the fact that he is not the one directly 
consulting the attorney.  If this is the case, if the transferee pays the 
attorney’s fee, the Model Rules of Professional Conduct give guidance 
about the attorney’s responsibilities.62  The discussion above regarding 
maintaining client confidences would apply equally to this situation 
because the potential victim is still the client. 
On the other hand, the attorney may consider the transferee to be 
his client.  Were that the case, the attorney would be learning of the 
potential abuse from the perpetrator rather than the victim.  Under the 
older Model Code of Professional Conduct, an attorney can reveal 
confidential information concerning his client’s intent to commit a 
crime.63  Under the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, however, 
there is no such exception to the duty to maintain client confidences.64 
Two basic policies compete in attempting to resolve the issue of 
whether attorneys should be mandated, permitted and encouraged to 
reveal client confidences relating to whether exploitation is occurring.  
 
 61. See, e.g., Russell Carlisle, Model Rule 1.6 – Confidentiality of Information, NAELA 
QUARTERLY, Winter, 2001 (stating that “joint representation pervades the practice of elder law.  In 
the elder law setting, the persons present at the initial conference almost always include other family 
members, either spouse or children.”); Teresa Stanton Collett, Response to the Conference: The 
Ethics of Intergenerational Representation, 62 FORDHAM L. REV. 1453 (1994); Carolyn L. Dessin, 
Protecting the Older Client in Multi-Generation Representations, 30 FAM. L.Q. 247, 247 (2004). 
 62. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.8(f) (2004), which provides: 
(f)  A lawyer shall not accept compensation for representing a client from one other than the client 
unless: 
(1)  the client gives informed consent; 
(2)  there is no interference with the lawyer’s independence of professional judgment or with the 
client-lawyer relationship; and 
(3)  information relating to representation of a client is protected as required by Rule 1.6. 
Id. 
 63. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT  DR 4-101(C)(3) (1980). 
 64. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6 (2004). 
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First, there is a strong policy underlying the protection of client 
confidences.  Second, there is an equally strong policy underlying the 
protection of vulnerable citizens from abuse. 
How these two policies should be balanced depends on whether the 
client is the victim or the abuser.  If the client is the victim, the attorney 
should report potential abuse only in two very limited circumstances.  
First, an attorney should report suspected abuse if he believes the client 
lacks the facilities to understand the fact that he is being abused.  This 
would be a state of mind similar to the standard for determining 
incompetence.  I am not, however, suggesting that a client must be 
adjudged incompetent before the attorney can conclude that he lacks the 
facilities to understand that he’s being abused. 
This focus on the client’s state of mind gives the appropriate 
respect to the client’s personal autonomy.  The attorney will report 
suspected abuse only if the attorney in her best judgment believes that 
the client’s state of mind is such that he could not consent knowingly to 
the transfer.  There is no provision for this in states that have no 
mandatory reporting statute or in states that have disciplinary rules that 
do not allow revealing client confidences “to comply with law,” but the 
spirit of the disciplinary rules to provide competent representation 
should be used to allow such reporting. 
Second, an attorney should report suspected abuse when he learns 
of the abuse from the perpetrator, i.e., the perpetrator is his client.  
Again, there is no explicit provision for this in states that have no 
mandatory reporting statute or in states that have disciplinary rules that 
do not allow revealing client confidences “to comply with law,” but the 
importance of preventing and remedying exploitation of the elderly 
should overcome the duty to maintain client confidences in those 
circumstances. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
Sadly, financial abuse of older citizens seems to be a rapidly 
growing problem.  As states look for solutions, mandatory reporting of 
suspected abuse by those most likely to see the signs of abuse is one 
attractive weapon against abuse.  Although many have criticized 
mandatory reporting as ineffective, there is no reason to do away with it 
if some reports of suspected abuse are made that would otherwise not be 
made. 
Attorneys are in an excellent position to discover abuse, particularly 
financial abuse.  An attorney is frequently an older client’s most trusted 
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advisor on financial matters.  Further, the attorney is often the only 
person with access to “the big picture” – the client’s net worth, assets, 
estate plans and tax returns.  Accordingly, the attorney may be the only 
person with enough knowledge of the client’s financial situation to be 
able to spot a potentially abusive transaction. 
In sum, then, the societal interest in protecting a vulnerable person 
from abuse is so compelling that the attorney’s duty to maintain client 
confidences should not defeat the furthering of that interest.  When an 
attorney has reason to suspect that abuse is occurring or will occur, the 
attorney should report that potential abuse to the appropriate protective 
authorities if the client seems incapable of consenting to the allegedly 
abusive conduct or if the attorney learns of the conduct from the alleged 
abuser.  Such reporting is a necessary limitation on the maintenance of 
client confidences that may help stem the rising tide of abuse of the 
vulnerable. 
